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DISCRIMINATION CASES
IN THE SUPREME COURT'S 1998 TERM
Eileen R. Kaufinan*
Last year, I began my discussion by noting that the Supreme
Court had decided a record number of statutory discrimination
cases.' However, that record was exceeded this past term with the
Court addressing issues arising under Title VI12 which covers
discrimination in employment, Title X3  which covers
discrimination in schools, and most significantly, the Americans
with Disabilities Act4 (hereinafter "ADA") which prohibits
discrimination based on disability. Overall, the term scored
significant victories for employers who were given considerable
latitude to set their own physical characteristic standards and who
were, to a large extent, immunized from liability for punitive
damages. [Consistent with themes sounded this morning by
Professor Friedman, there was an unmistakable federalism motif
playing in the background of some of these discrimination cases.]5
We will start with the ADA cases because they were
undoubtedly among the most important and far reaching decisions
of the term. These cases address basic and definitional issues and
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law
Center. B.A., Skidmore College, 1970; J.D., New York University, 1975;
L.L.M., New York University, 1992. Prior to serving as Vice Dean and
Professor of Law at Touro Law Center, Dean Kaufman was a Managing
Attorney at Westchester Legal Services, Inc. Professor Kaufman is a Reporter
for the New York Pattern Jury Instructions. She has published primarily in the
area of civil rights law.
1 See Eileen R. Kaufinan, Discrimination Cases In The Supreme Court's 1997
Term, 15 ToURO L. REv. 935 (1999).
2 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701-718, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) 2000(e)(17)
(1994) (which states in pertinent part: "It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to ... discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.. .
3 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). For
detailed discussion of the history of Title IX, see Diane Heckman, The
Explosion of Title 1X Legal Activity in Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992-93:
Defining the Equal Opportunity Standard, 1994 DET. C.L. REV. 953 (1994).
442 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
5 See Leon Friedman, Supreme Court Federalism Decisions, 1998-1999 Term,
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answer such fundamental questions as 1) whether an individual
whose condition is mitigated by medicine or corrective device can
assert an ADA claim when that individual was denied a job based
on that condition; 2) whether an individual who has applied for or
received social.security disability benefits can establish a claim
under the ADA; and 3) whether unnecessarily confining a mentally
impaired individual in an institutional setting when a community
setting is appropriate constitutes discrimination under the ADA.
The three chses that represent the Court's most significant
pronouncement with respect to disability law. are Sutton v. United
Airlines,6 Murphy v. United Parcel Service,7 and Albertsons v.
Kirkingburg. In these cases, the Court held that the determination
of whether or not a person is disabled within the meaning of the
ADA must be made by taking into account corrective or
mitigating measures, like eyeglasses9 or high blood pressure
medicine," or other compensatory measures, like the ability of the
brain to subconsciously compensate for weaknesses." Justice
O'Connor authored Sutton 2 and Murphy 3 and Justice Souter
authored Albertsons.'4 In each case, the vote was 7-2 with Justices
Stevens and Breyer dissenting.
Before we turn to the cases, let me very briefly lay out the
statutory scheme. Under the ADA, 5 an employer is prohibited
from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability.' 6 A qualified individual with a disability
6 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
7 Murphy v. United Parcel Service, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
a Albertsons v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
9 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
'0 Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137.
" Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2168 (citing 143 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1998)).
12 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
13 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
14 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
" 42 U.S.C §12182 (a) (1994). Section 12182 (a) provides in pertinent part:
"No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who
owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." Id.
16 42 U.S.C §12111 (8) (1994). Section 12111 (8) provides in pertinent part:
"The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a
[Vol 16346
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is a person who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that the
individual seeks.17 Most important to our purpose today, the
statute defines the term disability in three ways: first, a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity;
second, a record of such impairment; or third, being regarded as
having such an impairment.' 8 It is the first and third definitions
that are explored in these decisions.
The leading case in the trilogy is Sutton v. United Airlines,'9
involving twin sisters with severe myopia but whose vision was
corrected to 20/20 with glasses.2' They were employed as pilots
for a regional airline and met federal standards for airline pilots.2 '
The sisters applied for employment as commercial airline pilots
with United Airlines, but were denied because that airline required
uncorrected vision of 20/100 or better, a standard that the plaintiffs
could not meet.'
Plaintiffs sued under the ADA, alleging that United Airlines had
discriminated against them on the basis of their actual disability or
alternatively, because they were regarded as having a disability.'
The District Court dismissed their claim finding that they were not
disabled because their condition had been corrected by eyeglasses
or contact lenses, and they were not regarded as disabled because
they had only alleged that the employer regarded them as unable to
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires." Iad
17 29 U.S.C § 705 (20) (B) (1994). Section 705 (20) (B) provides in pertinent
part: "(A)ny person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of each person's major life activities; (ii) has a
record of such impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."
Id.
Is 42 U.S.C § 12102 (2) (1997). Section 12102 defines "disability" as the
following: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
'9 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).2 01d. at 2143.
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perform a specific job. 4 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, placing that
Circuit at odds with eight other Circuit Courts, including the
Second Circuit,' that had all held that disability is to be
determined without regard to mitigation. 6
The Supremes.Gourt affirmed, rejecting Equal- Employment
Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") and Department of
Justice interpretive guidelines that explicitly state that the disability
determination is to be made without regard to mitigating
measures." These agency guidelines, Justice O'Connor wrote, are
impermissible interpretations of the ADA for three reasons.2" First,
the ADA speaks in, what Justice O'Connor refers to as "the present
indicative verb form," indicating that conditions must be currently
disabling.29 Second, the ADA requires individualized assessments
of disability - what is this particular individual's condition - not
speculative assessments about how a condition might affect a
person.30  Third, congressional findings refer to 43,000,000
disabled Americans, which is far less than the number would be if
disability were determined without regard to mitigation.3 1 These
three provisions of the ADA, the Court concludes, make clear that
disability must be determined with reference to corrective
measures.32 The Court did not look at the legislative history of the
ADA, which, like the agency guidelines, clearly support evaluating
disabilities in their uncorrected state.3
Under the Court's interpretation of the term "disability," the
plaintiffs in Sutton were clearly not disabled since their corrected
vision was 20/20 and therefore, they were not substantially limited
24 Id. at 2144.
25 See, e.g., Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 156 F.3d
321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998).26 Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144.
27 29 CFR pt. 1630, App. § 1630.20) (1998); 28 CFR pt. 35, App. A, § 35.104
(1998).28 id.
29 id.
30 Id. at 2147.
31 id.
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in any major life activity.' 4 For the same reason, the plaintiff in
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, whose hypertension was
controlled by medication, was not disabled within the meaning of
the statute.' Similarly, the plaintiff in Albertsons v. Kirkingburg,
with monocular vision, must have his disability measured in light
of the fact that his brain had subconsciously compensated for his
lack of binocular vision.36
However, Albertsons does not end with a determination that the
plaintiff is not actually disabled under the statute. Plaintiffs had
argued in the alternative that they were regarded as disabled, and
according to the statute, that triggers coverage. 7 In these three
cases, one might suppose that since there was no question that the
plaintiffs were denied employment based on their physical
condition, that they would satisfy the "regarded as" standard. 3
The Court disagreed. In order to be "regarded as" disabled under
the ADA, the employer must regard the individual as substantially
limited in a major life activity, and being ineligible for a particular
job, does not suffice.39 Rather, plaintiffs would presumably have
to demonstrate that they are regarded as unable to work in a broad
class ofjobs.
The upshot of the decision is that it clearly authorizes employers
to set their own employment criteria.4 The Court explicitly tells
employers that they are free to prefer some physical characteristics
over others, to establish physical criteria, and to reject job
34 Id. (noting "(t)he use or nonuse of a corrective device does not determine
whether an individual is disabled; that determination depends on whether the
limitations an individual with an impairment actually faces are in fact
substantially limiting."). Id.
3. 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
36 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
37 Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138.
38 id.
39 Id. Citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(3) (1999), which states: "[t]he term
substantially limits means significantly restricted in the ability to perform either
a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to
perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the
major life activity of working." Id.
40Id. at 2139.
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applicants based on a physical impairment, so long as the
impairment, due to its correction, does not qualify as a disability
under the ADA. 42
Justice Stevens, along with Justice Breyer, vigorously dissented,
arguing that the legislative history as well as the guidelines issued
.by, the EEOC, the Justice Department and .the Department of
Transportation make it "abundantly clear that Congress intended
the ADA to cover individuals who could perform all of their major
life activities only with the help of ameliorative measures."43 As
an example, the dissenters cite the Senate Report which state that
the purpose of the "regarded as" definition of disability is to ensure
that "persons with medical conditions that are under control, and
that therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not
discriminated against on the basis of their medical conditions. For
example, individuals with controlled diabetes or epilepsy are often
denied jobs for which they are qualified, and such denials are the
result of negative attitudes and misinformation."'
The dissent thus concludes that the Act "generally protects
individuals who have 'correctable' substantially limiting
impairments from unjustified employment discrimination on the
basis of those impairments." "5 Under this view, would employers
like a commercial airline be forced to hire someone who could
endanger the lives of passengers? No, according to the dissent,
because under the statute, a disabled person must be qualified
[with or without reasonable accommodation] for the job and even
then, an employer may avoid liability by showing that its
employment qualification is job related and consistent with
business necessity or that it is justified to prevent a health or safety
hazard.46
Thus, according to the dissent, this case merely raises the
threshold question of whether or not the plaintiffs are disabled
within the meaning of the Act, not whether the employer, by
42 id.
431 Id. at 2154.
44 Id. at 2155. The Dissent is referring to and quoting S. REP. No. 101-I 16, at
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requiring a certain physical characteristic violated the statute."
This case just "asks whether the ADA lets the petitioners in the
door".' The dissent says: "Inside that door lies nothing more than
basic protection from irrational and unjustified discrimination
because of a characteristic that is beyond a person's control."'49
The dissent concludes by caustically referring to the Court's
"crabbed vision" of the ADA, pointing out that "the vision of
appellate judges is sometimes obscured by a concern that their
decision will legalize issues best left to the private sphere or will
magnify the work of an already-burdened judiciary." 50
The decision, not surprisingly, was praised by groups
representing employers and roundly criticized by groups
representing the disabled. Professor Feldman, from Georgetown
Law School, who helped draft the ADA, said the decisions "create
the absurd result of a person being disabled enough to be fired
from a job, but not disabled enough to challenge the firing."" On
the other hand, Stephen Bokat, General Counsel for the United
States Chamber of Commerce praised the Court and said "the
statute protects you from discrimination in a class of jobs, but it
does not guarantee you a particular job."
Before leaving these three cases, I should add a word about
Albertsons v. Kirkingburg s because that case went beyond
holding that plaintiff's disability, which consisted of monocular
vision, must be measured in light of his ability to compensate for
that condition.m The other issue addressed in Albertsons is
whether, under the ADA, an employer who adopts as a job
qualification, a waivable federal safety regulation, must then




50 Id. at 2162.
51 Linda Greenhouse, High Court Limits Who Is Protected By Disability Lznv,
N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1999, at Al.
52 Id
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necessity." The Court held that the ADA imposes no such
obligation on the employer.16  The job qualification at issue in
Albertsons was the vision standard of the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations, which Albertsons was required to follow."
However, the xegulations established an experimental waiver
program and the plaintiff argued that in light of the waiver
program, the employer could not rely on the federal regulation
without justifying that reliance. The Court disagreed and
essehtially held that employers need not justify qualification
standards imposed by federal safety regulations even when those
regulations are subject to waiver.59
The next ADA case is Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems
Inc.,' in which the issue was whether an individual in receipt of
social security disability benefits could simultaneously pursue a
claim under the ADA.6' Justice Breyer, writing for a unanimous
Court, concluded that the Social Security Act does not foreclose
the pursuit of an ADA claim, nor create a presumption against the
ADA plaintiff.6
In order to receive disability benefits under the Social Security
Act, the individual must be unable to engage in substantial gainful
55 Id. at 2170; See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), which states in pertinent part: "It may
be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged
application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out
or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a
disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business
necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable
accommodation, as required under this subchapter.". Id.56 Id. at 2174.
57 Id. at 2169 (citing Department of Transportation's Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations, 49 CFR § 391.41 (b)(10)(1998)) (stating in pertinent part:
"Physical qualifications for drivers, [must have] distant visual acuity of at least
20/40 (Snellen) in each eye without corrective lenses or visual acuity separately
corrected to 20/20 (Snellen) or better with corrective lenses... and the ability to
recognize the colors of traffic signals and devices showing standard red, green,
and amber."). Id.58 Albertsons, 119 S. Ct. at 2174.
59 Id.
60 Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys., 119 S. Ct. 15 7 (1999).
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employment6 3 This means that the individual cannot perform
his/her past work nor engage in any kind of substantial gainful
work that exists in the national economy - a very tough standard to
meet.64  The question in Cleveland concerned the apparent
inconsistency between claiming to be unable to engage in
substantial gainful employment pursuant to the Social Security Act
and claiming to be able to perform the essential functions of a
specific job pursuant to the ADA.6 The plaintiff, Carolyn
Cleveland, worked for Policy Management System, where her
tasks included performing background checks on prospective
employees.6 After suffering a stroke that damaged her
concentration, memory, and language skills, Ms. Cleveland applied
for social security disability benefits and stated, in her application,
that she was disabled and unable to work.6' Approximately three
months later, before any action had been taken on her social
security application, Ms. Cleveland's condition improved. 3 She
returned to work and notified the Social Security office, which
thereupon denied her application.' However, a few days after the
Social Security Administration denied her application on the
ground that she had returned to work, plaintiff was fired.70 She
requested the Social Security office to reconsider its denial and
after a hearing, she was awarded social security disability benefits
retroactive to the date of her stroke.7 One week before that award,
63 Id. at 1601 (citing 42 U.S.C § 423 (d)(1)(A) (1995). The Act requires that
the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any...
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months." Id.
64 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C §423 (d)(2)(A) 1995), which states that the individual's
impairment must be "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his
previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy...." Id.
65 Cleveland, 119 S. Ct. at 1600-1601.
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Ms. Cleveland commenced an action under the ADA, claiming that
her employer had fired her without offering her proper
accommodations in violation of the ADA.'
The district court did not reach the accommodations issue
because it found that she was estopped from pursuing her ADA
claim in light of4 her receipt- of disability benefits. This fact,
therefore, prevented her from establishing an essential element of
her ADA claim, namely that she could perform the essential
functions of her j o.- ' The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that "the
application for and receipt of social security disability benefits
creates a rebuttable presumption that the claimant or recipient,...
is judicially estopped from asserting that she is a qualified
individual with a disability." 74
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed finding that, although
the two statutory schemes create an appearance of conflict, "the
two claims do not inherently conflict to the point where courts
should apply a special negative presumption... because there are
too many situations where a social security disability claim and an
ADA claim "can comfortably exist side by side., 75 How can these
claims co-exist? Easily. First, the ADA defines a qualified person
as a disabled person who can perform the essential functions of the
job with reasonable accommodations, whereas the Social Security
Act does not take the possibility of reasonable accommodations
into account76 in determining whether an individual is disabled for
purposes of receiving disability benefits. Thus, an ADA claim
based on an employer's failure to provide reasonable
accommodations can be reconciled with an application for
disability benefits which asserts that without the accommodations,
72id.
73 Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys., 119 S. Ct. 1597, 1600 (1999).
74 Cleveland, 120 F.3d. 513, 518 (5th Cir.1997).
75 Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys., 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999)
76 Id. at 1600-01. The Court referred to the pertinent part of the ADA which
states that "with reasonable accommodation" may include: "job restructuring,
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (9) (B) 1995).
[Vol 16
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the applicant is unable to work.7 Second, given the huge volume
of social security disability applications, the decision making
process utilizes a number of presumptions and that kind of process
does not lend itself to highly individualized determinations. 8 Third
is timing. 9 A disabling condition may change over time so that
assertions about total disability may not reflect the declarant's
actual condition at the time of the contested employment
decision.' In fact, under the Social Security Act, a recipient may
receive benefits for a nine month trial work period to facilitate that
person's re-entry into the workplace." Finally, there is nothing
unusual in permitting litigants to assert alternate theories,
regardless of consistency.' The legal system allows this all the
time. For all these reasons, the Court held that it would be unfair
to apply a negative presumption to the ADA plaintiff who has
applied for or received social security benefits.3
Although a negative presumption is unwarranted,' the employer
may be entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff fails to
offer a sufficient explanation of what would otherwise appear to be
an inherent inconsistency between her declaration to the Social
Security Administration that she is unable to work and her
assertion in the ADA claim that she is able.' Thus, to defeat
summary judgment, the ADA plaintiff must proffer a sufficient
explanation "to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that,
assuming the truth of, or the plaintiffs good faith belief in, the
earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless 'perform the
essential functions' of her job, with or without 'reasonable
accommodation'." 86 A sensible decision that basicaUy requires the
plaintiff to explain away the apparent inconsistency.
77 1d. at 1602.78 id.
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The last case involving the ADA is Olmstead v. Zimring.
87
Unlike the previous four cases which deal with Title I covering
employment discrimination,8 Olmstead required the Court to
venture into Title 19 which prohibits discrimination in public
services farnished -by governmental entities.' ° Implementing
regulations require that services and programs be administered "in
the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities."'" The most integrated setting
standard is defined as a "setting that enables individuals with
disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest
extent possible."' The regulations further require public entities to
make "reasonable modifications" in their programs to avoid
discrimination, unless those modifications would entail a
"fundamental alteration" of the state's program.'
The two plaintiffs in this case challenged their confinement in
Georgia Regional Hospital, after their treating physicians had
determined that they could be appropriately treated in a
community-based setting.' 4 The district court agreed, rejecting
defendant's argument that inadequate funding, rather than
discrimination, explained the plaintiffs' retention in an institutional
setting. The court held that "unnecessary institutional segregation
of the disabled constitutes discrimination per se, which cannot be
17 119 S. Ct. 2176 (1999).
8 See, Sutton v. United Airlines, 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999); Murphy v. United
Parcel Service, 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999); Albertsons v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct.
2162 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys., 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999).
'9 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1995).
90 Id. The provision of Title I of the ADA states in pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any
such entity." "Public entity" includes "any State or local government,
and any department, agency or special purpose district. Id.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 (1)(A), (B).
91 Olmstead v. Zimring, 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2183.
92 Id.
93 id.
94 Id. L.C. and E.W. are mentally retarded women. L.C. also has been
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and E.W. with a personality disorder. Both
women have a history of treatment in institutional settings. Id.
356 [Vol 16
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justified by a lack of funding."' The Eleventh Circuit agreed,
although it found that, under certain circumstances, the state's lack
of resources could constitute a defense. 16
The Supreme Court, with Justice Ginsburg writing for a 6-3
majority, affined the Court of Appeals in substantial part,
agreeing that "unjustified isolation is properly regarded as
discrimination based on disability" within the meaning of the
statute. 7 However, the Court held that the obligation to care for
people in community based settings could be limited by the state's
available resources." In evaluating the state's defense, courts must
consider the cost of providing community-based care, the range of
services the state provides to others with mental disabilities, and
the state's obligation to mete out these services equitably." Thus,
we are told, if a state were to demonstrate that "it had a
comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified
persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a
waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the
State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the
reasonable modifications standard would be met."'1'0
The holding of the case is that "states are required to provide
community-based treatment for persons with mental disabilities
when the State's treatment professionals determine that such
placement is appropriate, the affected persons do not oppose such
treatment, and the placement can be reasonably accommodated,
taking into account the resources available to the State and the
needs of others with mental disabilities."'0 '
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy warned of the potential
dangers of deinstitutionalization and counseled for a cautious and
circumspect application of the Court's decision, lest it be
interpreted in a way that drives states to move persons in need of
95 Zimring v. Olmstead, 1997 WVL 148674 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
96 Zimring v. Olmstead, 149 F.3d 1197 (1 1 Cir. 1998).
97 Olmstead, 119 S. Ct. at 2185.
98 Id.
99Id.
'0 Id. at 2189.
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insitutionalization to insufficiently supervised settings out of a fear
of litigation.'02
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, in which he argued that the
majority has created a "new species of discrimination" bearing no
relationship (to the traditional understanding of the word
discrimination which requires some sort of disparate or differential
treatment.1 3 Further, he laments the "significant federalism costs"
imposed by t,4e majority which-in effect directs states how to make
decisions about their delivery of services."°
Parenthetically, one of the plaintiffs in Olmstead is now living in
a three person group home and the other is living in her own
apartment with supportive services.' °
In addition to these important ADA cases,' 6 the Court also
decided three sex discrimination cases, one arising under Title
IX °7 and two arising under Title VII.1°8 These cases represent the
Court's continued effort to define the liability of schools" and
employers for discrimination,10 themes we addressed last year at
this conference."'
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,"2 the Supreme
Court held that a private cause of action for damages under Title
10 2 1d. at 2191 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 2198 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104 Id.
1o5 See Linda Greenhouse, States Limited on Institutionalization, N.Y.TIMES,
June 23, 1999, at A16.
'
0 6 See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
107 See Davis v. Monroe Co. Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999); see also
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 86 Stat. 373, as amended, 20 U.
S. C. § 1681 etseq. (hereinafter Title IX).
108 See West v. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. 1906 (1999); Kolstad v. American Dental
Association, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999); see also Title VII of Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) which provides, in relevant part, that "[lit shall
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's ... sex . . . ." (hereinafter "Title
VII"). Id.
109 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110 See suprna note 108 and accompanying text.
m See Kaufman, supra note 1, at 935-952.
12Davis, 119 S. Ct. 1661.
358 [Vol 16
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IX may be brought against a school district in cases of student-on-
student sexual harassment, but only when the school district acts
with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment and only
when the harassment is so severe, pervasive and objectively
offensive that it effectively bars the victim's access to an
educational opportunity or benefit." 3
This decision was somewhat predictable because the Court had
adopted substantially the same standard one year earlier in Gebser
v. Lago Vista Independent School District'"4 in the context of
teacher-on-student harassment." 5 Justice O'Connor authored both
opinions" 6 but interestingly in Gebser, she was writing against a
dissent" 7 that vigorously argued that few Title IX plaintiffs who
have been victims of intentional discrimination will be able to
recover damages under this exceedingly high standard," 8 whereas
in Davis, she wrote against a dissent that argued just as vigorously
that too many Title IX plaintiffs would be able to recover" 9 and
the four justices that formed Justice O'Connor's majority in
Gebser" were the four who dissented in Davis.'
2 '
In Davis, a fifth grade student, LaShonda, was subjected to
repeated acts of sexual harassment by a classmate, " referred to in
the opinion as G.F, who eventually was convicted of sexual battery
113 Id.
114 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (holding that a school district is not liable for the
discriminatory conduct of a teacher unless it had actual notice and exhibited
deliberate indifference to the discrimination). Id.
115 Id.
1 6 See the majority opinions of Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (1999) and Davis, 119 S.
Ct. 1661 (1999).
117 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284. The dissent argued that imposing vicarious
liability made sense because it serves to induce the school district to adopt and
enforce practices to prevent this kind of behavior, and that the rule adopted by
the majority does exactly the opposite. Id.
118M
"9 Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1685 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
120 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 276. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas joined Justice O'Connor in the opinion of the court. Id. at 276.
12 See Davis, 119 S. CL at 1677. In Davis, Justices Kennedy, Scalia and
Thomas along with Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 1677.




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAW REVIEW
against her."2 Over many months, G.F. acted in a sexually
suggestive way, rubbing his body against LaShonda, placing a
door stop in his pants, attempting to touch LaShonda's breasts and
genital areas, and making sexual comments to her.'24 According to
the complaint, LaShonda's grades suffered as a result of this
prolonged pattern of harassment," she expressed fears about how
long she could keep G.F. off of her, and she wrote a suicide note
which her father discovered.
26
LaShonda's mother repeatedly complained to teachers and to the
principal but no disciplinary action was taken against G.F. nor was
any attempt made to separate the two students.2 7  After three
months of complaining, LaShonda was finally permitted to change
her seat in class.
128
LaShonda's mother filed suit against the school district, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages. 129  The district court
dismissed the claim, finding that Title IX does not encompass
claims of student-on-student harassment and the Eleventh Circuit,
sitting en banc, agreed.13
Justice O'Connor wrote for the bitterly divided 5-4 majority,'
3'
reversing the Eleventh Circuit and holding that Title IX does
encompass damage claims based on student-on-student
harassment,132  however only under very proscribed
circumstances. 33 The Court framed the issue in terms of whether
the misconduct identified in Gebser that gives rise to a damages
claim under Title IX - deliberate indifference to known acts of
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1666. G.F. told LaShonda, "I want to get in bed with you and I want
to feel your boobs." Id.
125 Id. The harassment began in January 1993, and ended finally in mid-May,
when G.F. was charged with and pled guilty to sexual battery for his
misconduct. Id.
'




130 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (1 1h Cir. 1996).
13' Davis, 119 Sup Ct. at 1667.
132 Davis, 119 S. Ct. 1661.
'.. Id. at 1671.
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harassment of a student by a teacher - is equally actionable when
the harasser is a student rather than a teacher.' The Court
concluded that it is but only "in certain limited circumstances"'-3 -
when the school district exercises substantial control over both the
harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs, or
expressed in other words, when the harasser is under the school's
disciplinary authority.1 36 Applying that standard to the facts at bar,
the Court had little trouble concluding that, since the misconduct
occurred during school hours and on school grounds, the district
had substantial control over the context as well as over the
harasser.
1 37
What must a school district do when it learns of student-on-
student sexual harassment? Is expulsion of the harassing student
always required? No, according to Justice O'Connor.33 Rather,
school districts retain flexibility in reacting to peer harassment and
incur liability only when their response is clearly unreasonable in
light of the known circumstances.139 Indeed, Justice O'Connor
cautions that courts should not second guess disciplinary decisions
made by school administrators and even suggests that courts
should not refrain from dismissing cases at the pleadings stage or
on summary judgment based on a determination that the school's
response was not "clearly unreasonable."'"
The Court made clear that not all forms of sexual harassment
constitute proscribed discrimination within the meaning of Title
IX. Only sexual harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of
access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the
school support an action for damages under Title IX.' 4'
The Court provided an example from each end of the
spectrum." The most obvious example of actionable peer
134 id.
135 id.
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harassment, according to the Court, would be "the overt, physical
deprivation of access to school resources" as where male students
physically threaten female students and prevent their use of a
particular school resource such as a computer lab or an athletic
field.1 43 If the school district was made aware of this conduct and
failed to take any action, that would constitute deliberate
indifference which would be actionable.'" At the other end of the
spectrum are what the Court refers to as simple acts of teasing and
name-calling, which will not support an -action for damages, even
when the comments target differences in gender.145 In between, the
Court directs a consideration of the entire constellation of
surrounding circumstances, including, of course, the ages of the
harasser and the victim. "
Applying these standards to the case at hand, the Court
concluded that it was error to dismiss petitioner's case, given 1) the
allegations regarding prolonged sexual harassment that was severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive; 2) the allegations that the
harassment had a concrete, negative effect on LaShonda's ability
to receive an education; and 3) the allegations that the school
district had actual knowledge yet made no effort whatsoever to
investigate or stop the harassment. 47
Justice Kennedy wrote a lengthy and angry dissent, 4' joined by
the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas, in which he
forecasts an uncontrollable flood of lawsuits against school
districts, who, in an effort to protect themselves against crushing
liability, will adopt ludicrous measures such as suspending a six
year old boy for kissing a female classmate as a North Carolina
school district did. 4 9 Of interest to this audience may be Justice
Kennedy's prophecy that the majority decision "will support






47 Id. at 1676.
148 Id. at 1677 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
149 Id. at 1689-90.
5' Id. at 1691.
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Based on Spending Clause jurisprudence, the dissent argued that
under no circumstances should Title IX be read to encompass
damage claims based on student-on-student harassment because
Congress failed to give sufficiently clear notice to the states that
their acceptance of federal funding would subject them to these
damage claims."'
To the dissent, "this case is about federalism."'" Justice
Kennedy writes "I can conceive of few interventions more
intrusive upon the delicate and vital relations between teacher and
student, between student and student, and between the State and its
citizens than the one the Court creates today by its own hand.'
Trusted principles of federalism are superseded by a more
contemporary imperative." " (Is Justice Kennedy accusing the
Court of political correctness?) Justice Kennedy worries that "The
Nation's schoolchildren will learn their first lessons about
federalism in classrooms where the federal government is the ever-
present regulator... After today, Johnny will find that the routine
problems of adolescence are to be resolved by invoking a federal
right to demand assignment to a desk two rows away." 155
When Justice O'Connor announced the Court's decision on May
24, 1999, she responded to Justice Kennedy who, she said,
maintained that the ruling would "teach little Johnny a perverse
lesson in Federalism." Rather, she said, the majority believed the
decision "assures that little Mary may attend class."'
56
The last two discrimination cases of the term are two Title
VIP's7 cases: West v. Gibson.5  dealing with compensatory
15 1 See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1677.
1521d. at 1691.
'5 3 Id. at 1692.
5 Id.
155 Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1677.
156 id.
157 Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1995))
provides, in relevant part, that "[I]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's ... sex.. .... Id
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damages and Kolstad v. American Dental Association159 dealing
with punitive damages.
In West, the Court held that the EEOC has the power to award
compensatory damages)60 Justice Breyer, writing for the
majorit ,J L -oncluded'that whew Congress 'amended the statute in
199116 to authorize the recovery of compensatory damages, it
effectively gave the EEOC the power to award compensatory
damages.'6- Since the statute explicitly gives the EEOC the
authority to enforce the Act through "appropriate remedies"'6 and
since the 1991 amendment made compensatory damages a newly
recognized appropriate remedy, the EEOC has the power to award
compensatory damages. 65
Like Davis,'66 this case was a 5-4 decision with the same four
justices writing in dissent (Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia and
Thomas) 67 . The dissent argued that the EEOC could not award
compensatory damages against the federal government in the
absence of a clear and express waiver of sovereign immunity,
which the dissenters failed to find in the relevant statutory
provisions. 168
The second Title VII case of the term, Kolstad v American
Dental Association, 69 ostensibly concerned the standard for
'59 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
160 West, 119 S. Ct. at 1909-10.
161 Id. at 1908.
162 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 105 Stat. 1072, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(l) (1995).
The Court referred to the pertinent parts of the Compensatory Damages
Amendment: "In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706
[discrimination by private employers] or 717 [discrimination by the Federal
Government] against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional
discrimination ... the complaining party may recover compensatory damages."
Id.
163 West, 119 S. Ct. at 1909-10.
164 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C § 2000e-16(b) (1995)).
165 See id. at 1909-10.
166 119 S. Ct. 1661.
167 West, 119 S. Ct. at 1913.
168 Id. at 1913-14.
169Kolstad, I 1 9 S. Ct. 2118.
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awarding punitive damages 7' but, in an unusual move, the Court
reached beyond the punitive damages question to address the
question of respondeat superior liability for punitive damages."' It
should be noted that while Kolstad was a Title VIIP case, the
decision affects the ADA as well because the punitive damages
statute at issue, section 1981a," applies to both Title VII and the
ADA.
174
Carole Kolstad brought a Title VII action based on her claim that
she had been passed over for promotion due to her sex."5 The jury
returned a verdict in her favor and awarded her $52,718 but the
court refused to charge the jury on punitive damages.176 The D.C.
Circuit en banc affirmed in a 6-5 decision," holding that punitive
damages may only be awarded upon a showing of egregious
misconduct, which plaintiff had failed to show.73
The Supreme Court, with Justice O'Connor writing for the
majority, concluded that an award of punitive damages is not
dependent on a showing of egregious behavior. 79  Rather, the
statutory standard, which authorizes punitive damages when the
employer engages in discriminatory practices with "malice or with
reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of the
aggrieved individual" is a state of mind standard. "~' This differs
' 70 Id. at 2124. The Court determined that Congress intended to impose "two
standards of liability [under 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a]-one for establishing a right to
compensatory damages and another, higher standard that a plaintiff must satisfy
to qualify for a punitive award." Id.
171 Id. at 2127-29.
' Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1995)).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1995). The statute states in pertinent part that "[a]
complaining party may recover punitive damages... if the complaining party
demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice... with
malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1995).
174 42 U.S.C. § 1981a provides a right of recovery for damages in cases of
intentional discrimination in employment.
175 Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 912 F.Supp. 13, 14 (D.D.C. 1996).
176 id.
177 Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 139 F.3d 958, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1998).179 Id.
'79 Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2124.
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from an egregiousness standard that focuses more on the character
of the conduct than on the state of mind of the actor.' While
egregious conduct may evidence the requisite state of mind, it is
not required under the statute.' 8' Further, the Court held that the
terms "malice" and "reckless indifference" refer "to the employer's
knoWledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, not its
awareness that it is engaging in discrimination."' 83  Under this
standard, not every act of intentional discrimination will warrant a
puni~ve damages award:' 84 -for example, where the employer is
unaware of the relevant federal prohibition or where the employer
believes that its discrimination is lawful or where plaintiffs theory
of recovery is novel or where the employer reasonably believes
that its discrimination fits within a statutory exception to
liability."s On this point, seven justices were in agreement.8 6 So
far, so good.
Far more controversial than the actual holding in Kolstad was
that portion of the opinion that addressed an issue not briefed nor
argued by the parties nor addressed by the Circuit Court and
suggested only in an amicus brief filed by the United States
Chambers of Commerce 1"7- namely under what circumstances an
181 Id. at 2126.
112 Id. at 2125.
183 Id.
184 id.
185 Id. The Court referred to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1995), a Title VII
defense which spells out bona fide occupational qualifications, and provides
that:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire
and employ employees, for an employment agency to classify, or refer
for employment any individual, for a labor organization to classify its
membership or to classify or refer for employment any individual, or for
an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining programs to
admit or employ any individual in any such program, on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise.
Id.
186 Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2118.
117 Id. at 2125.
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employer can be vicariously liable for punitive damages.183
Indeed, Kolstad would appear to be a peculiar vehicle to address
this issue given the high position of the wrongdoers, one was the
executive director and the other was the acting head of the
Washington office.' 89 The Court, this time in a 5-4 split90 decided
that "an employer may not be vicariously liable for the
discriminatory employment decisions of managerial agents where
those decisions are contrary to the employer's 'good-faith efforts
to comply with Title VII."' 9' In formulating this defense, the Court
drew, selectively, on agency principles. On the one hand, the Court
adopted the common law view that places strict limits on the
imputation of an agent's misconduct to the principal for purposes
of punitive damage awards. " On the other hand, the Court rejected
the Restatement of Agency's'93 view that employers may be liable
for punitive damages based on intentional misconduct by
managerial employees within the scope of employment even when
that conduct has been prohibited by the employer."'9 This, the
Court said, would penalize employers who educate themselves
about Title VII and would reduce the incentive for employers to
adopt programs and policies designed to prevent discrimination in
the workplace. 95 Clearly, the Court disapproved of holding
employers liable for punitive damages when they have made good
faith efforts to comply with Title VII.'
This approach of offering employers an affirmative defense is
consistent with the approach adopted by the Court the previous
term in Burlington Industries v. Ellerth'9' and Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton,' where the Court offered employers an affirmative
188 Id.
" 9 Id. at 2122.
'90 Id. at 2127. "Justice Stevens urges that we should not consider these
limitations here." Id.
191 d. at 2129.
'92 Id. at 2125.
'93 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C (1957).
'94 Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129.
195 Id.
196 Id.
'97 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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defense in order to avoid liability in sexual harassment hostile
environment cases that do not involve a tangible employment
action."' This case reinforces the clear message conveyed to
employers in Burlington IndustryV00 and Faragher°' - namely that
employers can protect themselves from liability by adopting anti-
discrimination policies and effectively disseminating information
about those policies throughout the workplace. °2
What is much less clear is the intersection between Kolstad0 3
and the earlier decisions in Burlington0 4 & Faragher.2 5 The rule
articulated in Kolstad refers to managers, 2 ' but the Court offers no
fully developed definition of a manager other than noting that a
manager is an employee who is important but not necessarily top
management.2°  It remains to be seen how or whether this
coincides with the Court's use of the term supervisor, defined as
one with immediate or successively higher authority over the
employee.0 8 If supervisors and managers are identical, one would
think the Court would have used the same term. Further, is the
employer liable for punitive damages when the discrimination
consists of a tangible employment action such as one that
significantly changes an employee's status or is the good faith
defense available even in those cases? Under Burlington, tangible
employment action is deemed to be the action of the employer
because it requires an official act of the enterprise."° In such a
case, is the good faith defense available? One would think not,
although the issue is not addressed in the opinion.
Another issue that remains unclear in Kolstad relates to the
contours of this good faith defense.2 '0 How is it to be satisfied? Is
'99 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
200 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
201 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
202 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
203 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
204 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
205 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
206Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2128.
207 Id.
20 8 See Burlington, 524 U.S. at 765. (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807).
209 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 762.
210 KoIstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129.
368 [Vol 16
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 2, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/10
DISCRIMINATHON CASES
merely having an anti---discrimination policy sufficient? The
Tenth Circuit, in one of the first cases2" to interpret Kolstad,
recently answered this question and held that an employer was
vicariously liable for punitive damages despite the fact that it had a
written nondiscrimination policy. 12 The Court held that Kolstad's
good faith defense was unavailable to the employer, Wal-Mart,
because despite its written nondiscrimination policy, it had failed
to make a good faith effort to educate its employees. Thus, an
award of $75,000 in punitive damages was upheld.1 3
Kolstad's message to employers could not be clearer -
Prevention is the way to avoid liability.21 ' What does prevention
consist of? Answers are suggested in EEOC recommendations
released on June 18, 1999,2"5 which management advisors are
instructing companies to adopt. For those of you in the audience in
a position to advise employers, here is a sampling of steps that
employers can and should take:
*Creating and disseminating a strong anti-harassment policy,
including training programs for employees and supervisors.
*Encouraging employees and supervisors to report any
harassment they observe.
*Developing flexible complaint procedures.
*Designating someone outside the employee's chain of
command to hear harassment complaints.
211 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187
F.3d 1241 (le Cir. 1999).
212 Id. at 1248-49. The Court stated that a "written policy against
discrimination . . . alone is not enough," and found that Wal-Mart had not
engaged in a "good faith effort to educate its employees about the ADA's
prohibitions." Id.
213 Id. at 1249. The Court stated that "[g]iven the intentional and flagrant
violation of the ADA in this case, the award of S75,000, one-fourth the statutory
maximum, does not shock our judicial conscience." Id.
214 Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129. "[G]iving punitive damage protection to
employers who make good-faith efforts to prevent discrimination in the
workplace accomplishes Title VII's objective of motivating employers to detect
and deter Title VII violations." Id. (citing Kolstad, 139 F.3d 958,974 (D.C. Cir.
1998)) (Tatel, J., dissenting).
215 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, COMPLIANCE MANUAL
915.002, COMMIssION's ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR
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*Investigating complaints promptly & taking immediate
corrective action.
If an employer were to adopt these measures, it seems clear that
the employer would be protected against liability for punitive
damages under the standard adopted in Kolstad.
216
216 Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119 S. Ct. 2118 (1999).
370 [Vol 16
26
Touro Law Review, Vol. 16 [2000], No. 2, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/10
